Eras and Our Terms for Them

We are told that we live in a post-modern age. Of course, we had to go through a modern age just to get here. But part of the problem is that many of us (me included) don't quite remember when there was a switch from modern to post-modern. But they say - whoever 'they' are - that the switch happened somewhere around the early 90s. Of course, there is dispute among 'them' as to whether it wasn't much later, perhaps closer to the end of the millennium. Whenever it happened, it seems like there should have been some sort of warning cry, a declarative: 'here it comes!' or something of the sort. Then we could have prepared a bit more. It was a great shock going from modern to post-modern; but then again, perhaps I'm only echoing the voices of those that knew - that is, the 'they'.

But does every age know about this eventual shift in era? I often wonder whether the ancients, for example, knew that they were, well, ancient? I wonder if they had a name for their era? It seems reasonable to think that they might have thought they were living in a modern age, a kind of present where everything around them - including development of architecture, tools, way of doing things, fashion, etc - was mostly new. Of course, tribal cultures might have not been interested in such things as temporal identifiers like the word 'era' or 'age'. It might have sufficed them to simply live in nature, if that's what they were doing, without the question of such significations even arising. They might not have thought about such things as 'terms' to describe their era. But this only leads to further questions regarding the sense the word 'era' has, which will come later.

Westerners seem to have always, or at least for a long time, been occuppied with terms to set off the times they live in. The Renaissance is one such term: the rebirth - rebirth of what? Old ideas in new clothing is what it seems. But isn't that common practice by any cultural context's standing, today being no different. One could ask what's new under the sun, really, except for a hightened level of technology? But the fact of rising levels of technology isn't new either. It has always been on the rise as people's lives have become more complex - though, I should say, complexity does not necessitate an advance in technology.

And what about the Middle Ages? Did the people of the Middle Ages think they were living in a middle period? And shouldn't we wonder where the end is of what seems to be suggested as a historical line here in order that we might distinguish this middle point? One could raise similar questions about the Dark Ages? I'm sure people weren't well off, but would they have said they were in a dark age? Perhaps. But I think, given the circumstances, people in bad parts of the world today have reason to think that this age is the dark age. Some might say today that the Dark Ages never passed. And yet, even if many did believe that they were living in the Dark Age, you never hear anywhere that there was a Post-Dark Age or even a post-Renaissance age, or post-Enlightenment age - well actually, I heard a few from the many ivory towers of academia refer to a post-Enlightenment age (but I'd say that the historical context in which the person was speaking from makes it so it doesn't count generally speaking). But when can we say that those ages passed? More importantly, when did they say those ages passed into 'post'? Did the ages somehow fade into the backdrop of terms? To this degree, one might question what comes after the post-modern age. My teacher used to say I guess it would be called a post-post-modern age. And after that I guess we might have to put exponents to distinguish between them, though that would be confusing I think.

Also the idea that we signify points of time as 'eras' is troubling, getting back to a former question. While it's difficult to say when it is that we pass from era to era, I think it's even more troublesome to say that this is an era we're in now. It at least seems that eras are distinguishable one could argue, but only insofar as certain contexts are concerned. For example in the Dark Age era, I don't think that the Shamans living in the Russian steppes were much concerned about what was happening in France nor were they feeling any effect of a so called 'dark age'. Aborigines neither where having the same problems that threatened to crush the lives of those in Britain at the time of England's Dark Ages. So do eras concern everyone on the earth or just certain people? I guess the question is directed to a post-modern perspective. This is so mainly because 'they' are the ones concerned to hold no underlying thesis; yet here, we have a label that is underlying as meaningful for an age, a label which not everyone is in agreement with. We still have shamans and aborigines, as we have tribal cultures. Were these people asked if about carrying a label such as post-modern? I read somewhere that the post-modern era describes a way of thinking, architecture, writing, media, yada, yada. But the problem is the second part of post-modern era. 'Era' seems to point to more than a certain context of people; it points to everyone, all people. But as I understand it, post-modernism embraces and celebrates difference, with there being no one absolute as 'the' absolute. In that sense, it supposedly rebukes ideals of the modern age - the 'post' here suggesting that we got over that hump. But I guess this must not apply to things like temporal-spacio significations like 'era', this moment, this time.

Yet it seems that this ideal notion of signification is not as harmless as all that. Why should it be? Stalin's ideals as Hitler's ideals were just ideals: abstract thoughts thought in the abstract written down, sometimes, in places that illustrated the meaning of dire straits. But look how harmless the Holocaust was or that of the bloody history of a Stalin Russia. I guess one could say I'm making rediculous comparisons, or maybe at least, those that are a bit too extreme. Perhaps. But perhaps the violence that we find in those examples are analogous to the violent apathy that is intrinsic to the example that is the world we live in today. I'm not saying there is no caring; but I question what is the care itself like? One response is that it is nothing like any other response to the human condition in ages past. It is one that can be likened to animal watching at a zoo. We keep the danger far from us but revel at the danger; the movie culture watches super hero movies to keep from dying of vacuity; the popular culture elevates celebrity to divine status, and what has been deemed divine from forecultures past has been devolved to profane status; and truth is relegated to op-ed pieces by 'news journalists', most of whom have been effected by the ideology of 19th century Fox. We are one of the sole countries in the world, if not the sole country, who is at war though the country proper is in a relative state of peace. But what's important, I guess, is that we live in a post-modern age. I wonder if the innocent Iraquee people know this? I wonder if the American soldier cares to know this?

I find it interesting that some of the same tactics of humiliation and torture are used in this country today for so-called war criminals that are in concentration camps as were used in the Nazi concentration camps of World War II. But one could argue that they are not the same. To say that they are the same is to insult the scientific advances in psychology and sociology and not to mention the American identity and pride. No, today they use the same tactics but they are far more complex and elegant, taking so called humanity into account. Torture techniques of today are designed with much more thought and reflection, with the most advanced and cutting edge research findings being employed in their development.

Yet, I also find it appalling that humiliation and torture as such is still a practice today, especially in light of what is known about the Holocaust, but more generally, what we think of as 'humane'. And while some may argue that we have refined the torture techniques down to a psychological science, this not only does little to assuage the sense of disgust that arises in my throat, but actually increases the appalling nature of what is taking place. Here what we have is science without regulation from moral value. The death machine, far from being dismantled as a practice, instead is made even more precise in the methodical way it picks apart the minds of its victims. The moral argument is supposed to be that, unlike the innocent victims of the Holocaust, these people are prisoners of war, traitors, terrorists, those who bombed and were responsible for, in some way, perpetrating the deaths of other innocent lives, etc., etc. I have to wonder, however, what Hitler’s rationale was to enlist the aid of his country to justify the torture, humiliation, and ultimately, extermination of over 6 billion individuals. I suppose if the words sound reasonable enough, anything can be made to look just, moral, ethical, etc., etc. Let’s make them walk around naked; let’s make them wear hoods and pose in the nude while guards poke fun at their anatomy and take pictures. Of course, no one supposedly gave the guards orders to engage in such activity. But if it wasn’t for them getting caught, no one would also be the wiser. The question is why punish these guards for what the system allows for? After all, we’re supposed to be the scientifically advanced society which has designed this neo-torture device using the latest and greatest in psychological research. We can reasonably guess with statistical and psychological precision that prison guards will fall to human depravity sooner or later simply because that is what the studies show will happen to most people under the kinds of situation in which the guards find themselves. But what? Don’t we use statistics anymore? Does the ‘jail psychology experiment’ not count for anything? Doesn’t what happened at Auschwits and other concentration camps not matter when tallying up the psychological behaviors that occur in guards and prisoners in similar settings such as those found at Guantanamo Bay?

One might say that the analogy and examples I use here are strained ones, and the conditions which are described to the public are not 'that bad'. For example, I recall in one interview that Rumsfeld ridiculed the idea that certain critiques were being advanced regarding prisoners who were made to stand for thirty minutes. He said, ‘heck, I have to stand for thirty minutes or more everyday’ or something to that effect. But I wonder if he’s forced to stand for thirty minutes everyday with an orange hood covering his head and his hands tied behind his back in shackles, sometimes with guards shouting who knows what kind of obscenities at him, in a place he prays to silent gods that he could be taken from.

Still, I suppose in one respect we are more humane than any other barbaric predecesors that used humiliation and torture techniques on their prisoners. But if so, I think its necessary, then, to rethink what is meant by 'humane'. I think it would have to be one which torture constitutes its definition in some way. I wonder how close this comes to confusion, the kind that espouses a degredation of value and community understanding, the kind of thing that ultimately consumed great empires like Rome.

Philosophy: Perspicuity or Theology?

Philosophy is a kind of pagan sport. It tends to go outside the limits of considered contexts to ask questions which are not ordinarily asked within certain - if not all - religious communities, in our case, a Christian community. In this sense, it may well challenge one's basic beliefs and assumptions about the world and one's worldview - this, of course, includes religion. However, and many philosophers will degree with this next statement, philosophy will not give you truth about life. That is something left to faith, theology, religion, spirituality, etc. What philosophy can do is make that which one considers clear; it clarifies meaning within contexts. And while this project may seem simple, it is easier said that done. This is not to say that the history of philosophy has not been constituted by a journey for the search for truth, which has led humanity to many side passages and back alleys which at times confused what truth was. But the kind of journey for truth is what needs to be questioned here. That is, the term 'search for truth' is multifaceted though at first it may seem not to be. What philosophy looks at with regards to truth is not so much what is true, but what counts for truth within certain contexts. What I mean generally by context is bound up with a group, community, culture, and so forth and what those within think is true. And what they think is true may be conflicting within their own community. This is where philosophizing becomes not just grueling, but difficult conceptually, in other words, confusing.

I say this last part about the kind of inquiry of philosophy with tongue and cheek. Previous to the 20th century and I'd say the latter part of the 19th century, much of the search for truth was about finding 'the' truth. A recognition arose that made it, in my opinion, impossible to hold a 'one truth' kind of orientiation for those searching for this truth. There comes recognition that difference does not necessarily mean worse - it just means different. So the question then is how do we adjudicate which truth is 'the' truth. But if this question is asked, then what has changed? What is more important to know in order to be clear is what is the criteria that one holds as important. This will show what truth is for a particular group, community, culture, etc. Still, this is not to say that there are not those who cannot let go of the notion that there must be an all enompassing truth. But for those, I think philosophy has come to an end. There is a time to become clear of what one is talking about or considering, and a time to make up one's mind about what to believe. When this happens, one crosses over to a different realm which may be closer to a religious point of view.