On Mattering

If a person says happiness is what the basis of what morality is, then it seems that morality is just a matter of self-interest. But if we reflect on this, can it be right (i.e. good)? If one replies, 'I guess so' then the repercussions are pretty strong and wide ranging.

Think of and apply this response to something like friendship; that is, what is friendship good for except as some sort of utility? Here's the example: It's good to have friends because they can always help one out in a jam and because they're loyal. So under this premise, the only reason it matters to have a friend is for what the friend can consistently do for one. This doesn't seem to make sense with regard to what friendship is meant to be? And this same logical structure is equivalent to the following example. Say a student takes a philosophy class but her only interest is to do so in order to fulfill a requirement and raise her gradepoint average. To this student, the actual class, what it can show about life, what it is able to teach one about oneself, doesn't matter. And yet, given the subject matter with which philosophy deals, it may be that saying such a thing has moral implication, especially because philosophy deals with certain areas which touch upon moral matters.

Now a person might still say that these are different cases nevertheless and, given this fact, there is a disanalogy. But now, another could ask who makes the decision that these are different cases morally speaking? I mean, it might or might not apply depending on who's perspective one takes. But is morality a matter of perspective? If so, we're back to self-interest - in fact, we never left. But again, it seems that, if we reflect on our intuition on the matter, it doesn't seem that morality is about self-interest; that is, what matters seems to have to do with something more than ourselves. However, even if one agrees with this remark, it doesn't necessarily mean that a person's internal attitude changes only his outward expressions. A person might still not care, might think it doesn't matter to do the right thing, though act like it does matter without thinking of the consequences in the short or long run. But do the consequences matter, especially since we may not know what consequences those might be? Do consequences to acting morally have to do with morality? After all, one might act morally and be hurt by the consequences. This could be something to consider for the person merely acting morally, where a truly moral person may not care whatever about the consequences. So it seems that if I act morally, it doesn't necessarily mean that I am a moral person. I could be just looking after my own happiness which may sometime arise out of playing moral. That is, playing moral usually accords with social order which in itself may afford certain luxuries and, thereby, a certain amount of happiness. Here it appears that Bentham and Mill seem to be correct: generally, pleasure is happiness, and happiness is the basis of what it means to be moral. But there's the intuition again that seems to say otherwise.